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Abstract
Many collective decision making problems have a
combinatorial structure: the agents involved must
decide on multiple issues and their preferences over
one issue may depend on the choices adopted for
some of the others. Voting is an attractive method
for making collective decisions, but conducting a
multi-issue election is challenging. On the one hand,
requiring agents to vote by expressing their prefer-
ences over all combinations of issues is computa-
tionally infeasible; on the other, decomposing the
problem into several elections on smaller sets of
issues can lead to paradoxical outcomes. Any prag-
matic method for running a multi-issue election will
have to balance these two concerns. We identify
and analyse the problem of generating an agenda
for a given election, specifying which issues to vote
on together in local elections and in which order to
schedule those local elections.
1 Introduction
Many problems where a group of agents need to make a de-
cision have a combinatorial structure: for each of a set of
variables the agents need to choose a value, and each agent
has preferences over combinations of such choices. Examples
include voting in multiple referenda, where we have to decide
which of a set of propositions to accept, or electing a com-
mittee, where we have to decide how to fill each seat. Voting
in combinatorial domains has been studied in AI for some
time, due both to its relevance to multiagent systems and to
the fact that methods developed in knowledge representation
for modelling preferences provide important tools for tack-
ling some of the challenges it raises [Chevaleyre et al., 2008;
Lang and Xia, 2009; Li et al., 2010; Rossi et al., 2004].
When the issues to be decided upon are independent from
each other, then running a separate election for each issue is a
good solution. However, if some of the voters have preferential
dependencies among issues, then this can lead to paradoxical
outcomes, because voters will have to commit to a vote on one
issue before all the other issues their preferences depend on
have been settled [Brams et al., 1998]. Voting on all the issues
in a single election instead is not feasible for computational
reasons: there will be too many combinations for the voters
to rank and asking them to rank only some of them will yield
too little information to select a winner [Chevaleyre et al.,
2008]. A useful middle way is to vote sequentially: hold local
elections on each issue in sequence and reveal the outcome of
one election before the next one takes place [Lacy and Niou,
2000]. When there exists an agenda (i.e., a way of scheduling
these local elections) that is compatible with the preferential
dependencies of all the voters, then we avoid the paradoxes
typically encountered [Lang and Xia, 2009].
A generalisation of this idea is to hold a local election for
every combination of issues that cannot be decomposed due
to preferential dependencies of some of the voters. If no local
election is for a combination of a large number of issues (e.g.,
up to three issues), then the agents should be able to express a
ranking over the relevant combinations, and a standard voting
procedure can be used. In this paper, we isolate this problem of
agenda choice. We do this by introducing choice functions that
take the preferential dependencies of the voters (rather than
their full preference information) as input and that produce
an agenda determining the order in which local elections for
(small) combinations of issues are to be held. We make several
concrete proposals for such choice functions that allow us to
both keep the complexity of local elections at a manageable
level and to limit social choice-theoretic paradoxes arsing from
the voters’ uncertainty over their preferences.
The agenda choice problem is central to the challenge of
voting in combinatorial domains, but it has not previously
been identified as a research question in its own right. Rather
than proposing a “solution” to this difficult problem, we intro-
duce a technical framework in which to study it. Our specific
suggestions for agenda choice functions should be considered
examples against which to measure future proposals.
Much previous work on voting in combinatorial domains
concentrating on computational issues has assumed that the
preferences of voters are represented using CP-nets [Boutilier
et al., 2004]. We do not make this assumption, but our frame-
work is compatible with preferences being modelled as CP-
nets. Like us, Lang and Xia [2009] address the problem of
running several local elections to manage a large multi-issue
election. They study a domain restriction on preference pro-
files that guarantees that voters can vote issue-by-issue without
provoking a paradoxical outcome. Other related work includes
the contributions of Li et al. [2010], who propose an algorithm
for aggregating CP-nets which have a common graph struc-
ture (the opposite of our setting), and of Rossi et al. [2004],
who introduce so-called mCP-nets, a language for describing
profiles of CP-nets (rather than aggregating them).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 defines our formal framework, including the problem of
choosing an agenda. Section 3 then makes several proposals
for procedures to make that choice. Section 4 proposes ax-
ioms for agenda choice functions and analyses to what extent
our proposed procedures satisfy these. Before concluding,
Section 5 reports on an experiment highlighting the need to
balance computational and social choice-theoretic concerns
when deciding on a function to choose an agenda.
2 Formal Framework
Next, we introduce our framework for multi-issue elections
and the problem of selecting an agenda for such an election.
2.1 Multi-Issue Elections
Let I = {1, . . . , p} be a set of p ∈ N issues. Each issue i ∈ I
is associated with a finite domain Di (a set of possible values)
with |Di| ≥ 2. The Cartesian product of our domains is a
combinatorial domain D = D1 × · · · ×Dp. For any subset
I ⊆ I , we write D[I] as a shorthand for the Cartesian product
of the corresponding domains ×i∈IDi.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n ∈ N voters (or agents).
Each voter i ∈ N is equipped with a preference relation i
on D. We take each i to be a preorder, i.e., a binary relation
that is reflexive and transitive. For two alternatives x, y ∈ D,
x i y means that voter i weakly prefers x over y. We write
x i y (strict preference) if x i y but not y i x. If both
x i y and y i x, then i is indifferent between x and y. If
neither x i y nor y i x, then i is unable to rank them. Let
Pre(D) be the set of all preorders on D.
Remark 1 While most work in social choice theory takes
preferences to be linear or weak orders [Taylor, 2005], for
applications in AI it has been argued that it is appropriate
to work with more general structures, such as preorders, as
agents may lack the cognitive and computational resources to
fully rank all alternatives and as eliciting all relative rankings
may be costly and unnecessary [Pini et al., 2008].
Definition 2 A voting procedure for votersN and domain D
is a function V : Pre(D)N → 2D \ {∅}.
That is, V maps profiles of preorders over D supplied by the
voters in N to nonempty sets of winning alternatives in D.
(This is the standard definition of a voting correspondence,
except that we allow for preorders in the input [Taylor, 2005].)
2.2 Preferential Dependence
Next we define what it means for one issue to be preferen-
tially dependent on another issue, given a particular preference
relation . But let us first consider an example.
Example 3 This example is due to Lang and Xia [2009]. Sup-
pose the residents of a town need to collectively decide whether
to build a swimming pool (S) or a tennis court (T ). If a voter’s
preference is ST  S¯T  ST¯  S¯T¯ , then her preferences
for one issue are not affected by the choice made for the other
(e.g., she always prefers having the swimming pool). But if her
preferences are ST¯  S¯T  S¯T¯  ST (she wants a swim-
ming pool only in case building the tennis court is rejected),
then we say that she exhibits a preferential dependence.
We now define issue i to be preferentially dependent on issue j,
given some preference relation , if there exists a situation
where knowing the values chosen for all domains other than
Dj is not sufficient to decide which of two given values in Di
should be (weakly) preferred according to .
Definition 4 We say that issue i ∈ I is preferentially depen-
dent on issue j ∈ I given preference relation , if there
exist values x, x′ ∈ Di, y, y′ ∈ Dj , and a vector of val-
ues ~z ∈ D[I \ {i, j}] for the remaining domains such that
x.y.~z  x′.y.~z but x.y′.~z 6 x′.y′.~z.
Preferential dependence induces an irreflexive directed graph
on I, with an edge from i to j whenever j depends on i.
Definition 5 A dependency graph is an irreflexive directed
graph on I. The set of all such graphs is DG(I).
Remark 6 Dependency graphs are reminiscent of CP-nets
[Boutilier et al., 2004], a language for compact preference
representation. Note that here we do not introduce any spe-
cific language. Instead, we consider the class of all possible
preorders (CP-nets can only express a fraction of these).
2.3 Choosing an Agenda
Suppose our voters want to choose an alternative from D. In
principle, standard voting procedures, adapted for use with
preorders [Endriss et al., 2009], could be used, but in practice
this will be computationally infeasible. Instead, we want to
partition D into several smaller domains and run a sequence
of elections for these smaller domains. Which partition and
which sequence, i.e., which agenda, should we choose?
Definition 7 An agenda for the issues in I is a linear order
on a partition of I. The set of all agendas on I is AG(I).
If I ⊆ I is one of the subsets in the partition, then there will
be a local election to choose an alternative from the domain
D[I]; that is, all the issues in I will be voted on at the same
time. The linear order defined over the partition determines
the order in which these local elections are held.
Definition 8 A meta-agenda for I is an acyclic graph on a
partition of I. The set of all meta-agendas on I is MAG(I).
Sometimes it will be unnecessary to specify a fixed ordering
for two local elections (for instance, if none of the issues in
the first depend on any in the second, and vice versa, for any
of the voters). In such a case it suffices to specify a meta-
agenda representing an entire class of agendas, namely all
linear orders extending that meta-agenda.
Example 9 The following is an example for a meta-agenda
on four issues I = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
{2} {1, 4}
↘ ↙
{3}
This meta-agenda represents two agendas: (1) first run an
election on issue 2, then run an election on combinations of
issues 1 and 4, and finally run an election on issue 3; (2) first
vote on 1 and 4, then on 2, and finally on 3.
Our main object of study in this paper are functions that take
as input the dependency graphs over issues of the individ-
ual agents and return a meta-agenda (or, more precisely, a
nonempty set of meta-agendas, to account for possible ties):
Definition 10 A meta-agenda choice function (MACF) is a
function F : DG(I)N → 2MAG(I) \{∅}.
2.4 Designing a Voting Procedure
Before we turn to the study of MACFs, the main topic of
this paper, let us briefly sketch how we can design a voting
procedure for electing an element of D using a particular
MACF. Such a voting procedure will have three components:
(1) a MACF that takes the (reported) dependency graphs of
the voters as input and returns a set of meta-agendas S;
(2) an agenda selection function fAG : 2MAG(I) \{∅} →
AG(I) that selects an agenda A from those represented
by the meta-agendas in S; and
(3) a voting procedure selection function mapping any possi-
ble subset of I to a voting procedure for that subset. This
function specifies which voting procedure should be used
for each of the local elections in A.
The agenda selection function plays a similar role as a tie-
breaking rule in standard voting theory. The voting procedure
selection function can, in principle, specify a different local
procedure for each possible combination of issues. A more
natural choice, however, is to use a single voting procedure
(e.g., the Borda or the plurality rule [Taylor, 2005]) for all
local elections; or to specify a function that, say, selects the
Borda rule for small elections (e.g., four issues of fewer) and
the plurality rule otherwise. For simplicity, let us assume that
all local voting procedures are resolute (they always return a
unique winner, i.e., they incorporate a tie-breaking rule).
We now have a practical voting procedure: the MACF to-
gether with fAG determines an agenda, and then, following
that agenda, local elections are run using the selected local
voting procedure(s). After each local election, the voters are
informed about the issues that have been settled.
3 Meta-Agenda Choice Functions
In this section we define several concrete meta-agenda choice
functions. We do this by defining aggregation procedures on
dependency graphs; the resulting graphs can then be trans-
formed into meta-agendas by means of a process known as
graph condensation. We also discuss some of the properties
of the MACFs proposed and of the agendas they generate.
3.1 Preliminaries
As a first proposal, consider the following simple idea:
Example 11 To aggregate a profile of dependency graphs
(G1, . . . , Gn) into a meta-agenda, we construct a collective
dependency graph G∗. Consider each (ordered) pair of issues
(i, j) in turn, and include an edge from i to j in G∗ iff a ma-
jority of agents claims that j depends on i. G∗ determines
a meta-agenda: partition G∗ into its maximal strongly con-
nected components and link components x and y iff there is
an edge in G∗ from one of the nodes in x to one of those in y.
We call this method edgewise majority choice.
Transforming a graph G∗ on I into an acyclic graph on a
partition of I (i.e., into a meta-agenda) is known as condensa-
tion in graph theory. All procedures we will define are graph
aggregation procedures F : DG(I)N → DG(I) that have to
be combined with condensation to obtain a MACF.
We will assess the quality of agendas in terms of the com-
plexity they introduce (measured in terms of the number of
issues involved in a local election) and the extent to which
they generate uncertainty amongst the voters as to how they
should vote in a local election over an issue that depends on
other issues that have not yet been decided.
Example 12 Suppose three agents each have linearly ordered
dependencies over three issues: a→1 b→1 c, b→2 c→2 a,
and c →3 a →3 b. If we use edgewise majority choice to
find an agenda, then the result is an election with maximal
complexity: all three issues need to be decided together.
Example 13 Suppose three agents have only one dependency
each: a→1 b, b→2 c, and a→3 c. Edgewise majority choice
suggests to vote separately on each issue. If the selected order
is c→ b→ a, then each agent will face a local election where
she will be uncertain about her preferences.
The notion of uncertainty can be made precise in several ways.
One option is to use a dependency violation measure.
Definition 14 Let G∗ and Gi be dependency graphs. We
say that Gi has a dependency violation in G∗ iff (x, y) ∈
Gi and (x, y) /∈ G∗ for some (x, y) ∈ I × I.
Definition 15 A dependency violation measure is a function
H : DG(I)N × DG(I) → N with H(G1, . . . , Gn, G∗) = 0
iff no Gi, for i ≤ n, has a dependency violation in G∗.
Examples for choices of H include the sum of violations be-
tween the Gis and G∗, the number of agent/election pairs
where the agent experiences at least one uncertainty, the maxi-
mal number of violations experienced by any one agent, the
number of agents experiencing some violation, etc.
3.2 Quota-Based Choice Functions
One way to balance complexity and uncertainty is to generalise
edgewise majority voting by allowing for arbitrary quotas:
Definition 16 Edgewise choice with quota q, for q ∈ [0, 1],
is the graph aggregation procedure mapping (G1, . . . , Gn) to
G∗ =
{
(x, y) ∈ I2 : |{i : (x, y) ∈ Gi}| ≥ q · n
}
.
That is, under this rule we will respect a dependency iff at least
q · n agents express this dependency. By increasing the quota
we can reduce the size of the biggest cycle, while by lowering
it we can minimise the number of dependency violations.
3.3 Canonical Agendas
We now define a MACF that does not allow for dependency
violations. We call it the canonical MACF: the output is a
unique meta-agenda that merges all individual preferential
dependencies without adding any new ones.
Definition 17 The canonical graph aggregation procedure
is the function mapping each profile of dependency graphs
(G1, . . . , Gn) to the union graph
⋃
i∈N Gi.
In combination with graph condensation, this defines the
canonical MACF. The following properties are easy to verify:
Proposition 1 The canonical MACF is equivalent to the
MACF based on edgewise choice with quota 1n .
Proposition 2 The canonical MACF minimises the size of the
largest local election amongst all MACFs without dependency
violations.
Canonical agendas are not difficult to compute and we can
easily design an algorithm that will run in quadratic time. If
the size of the largest cycle is reasonably small, then this
represents a good method of choosing voting agendas.
But how often will we get a canonical agenda with “small”
local elections? Take an agenda A scheduling p single-issue
elections in turn, and consider how many dependency graphs
there are that are compatible with A. The kth issue may or
may not depend on any number of the k−1 issues scheduled
before it (but it must not depend on any of the issues scheduled
after it). Thus, there are
∑p
k=1(k − 1) = p(p−1)2 potential
dependencies that may or may not be realised, i.e., there are
2
p(p−1)
2 dependency graphs that are compatible with A. When
the agenda may contain elections on combinations of at most
two issues each, then eliciting the preferences still requires
relatively little effort, but this increases the number of depen-
dency graphs compatible with it:
Proposition 3 An agenda with local elections of size at most 2
is compatible with exponentially more dependency graphs than
an agenda with local elections of size 1.
Proof. An agenda with one-issue elections is compatible with
2
p(p−1)
2 graphs. If we allow for one election on a combination
of 2 issues, then this doubles the number of compatible graphs
(we can add one more edge). For p issues, we can schedule
up to bp2c elections of size 2. Thus, by iterating the previous
argument, an agenda where all (or all but one) elections have
size 2 is compatible with 2
p(p−1)
2 · 2b p2 c graphs. 
Lang and Xia [2009] make a similar point and show that
there are exponentially more legal (compatible with a linear
agenda) preference profiles than there are profiles with sepa-
rable (dependency-free) preferences.
3.4 Constraint-Based Choice Functions
Next we introduce a general class of MACFs balancing the size
of local elections and the severeness of dependency violations.
Definition 18 Given a dependency violation measure H ,
the constraint-based graph aggregation procedure FHk,` is
the function mapping each profile of dependency graphs
(G1, . . . , Gn) to the set of dependency graphs
{G∗ : H(G1, . . . , Gn, G∗) ≤ k and mc(G∗) ≤ `},
where mc(G∗) is the size of the maximal cycle in G∗.
Note that while constraint-based procedures yield sets of
graphs and quota-based procedures yield single graphs, both
can be extended to MACFs via graph condensation. The
MACF based on FHk,` is the function returning all meta-
agendas with maximal cluster size ` that result in an aggre-
gated number of dependency violations of at most k, when
these violations are measured using H . That is, k relates to
the parameter of uncertainty identified earlier, while ` directly
corresponds to the parameter of complexity.
Constraint-based procedures will often be computationally
intractable. For instance, if H is the maximal Hamming dis-
tance, then there is a simple reduction from the CLOSEST
STRING problem, which is known to be NP-hard [Li et al.,
1999]. A full complexity analysis of the family of constraint-
based procedures is an important project for future work.
In Definition 18 one of the two parameters (k and `) can
be kept fixed whilst performing an optimisation on the other.
This is the case for the canonical MACF, where ` is optimised
for k := 0. Another special case of this approach is the
following, which we call distance-based MACFs. The bound
on “computational badness” is irrelevant here (namely, the
size of the maximal cluster is ` := n).
Definition 19 The distance-based graph aggregation proce-
dure Fd,g for distance metric d : DG(I) × DG(I) → R on
dependency graphs and aggregation function g : RN → R
is the function mapping each profile of dependency graphs
(G1, . . . , Gn) to the set of dependency graphs
argminG∗∈DG(I) g(d(G1, G
∗), . . . , d(Gn, G∗)).
4 Axiomatic Analysis
Inspired by applications of the axiomatic method in social
choice theory, particularly voting theory [Taylor, 2005] and
judgment aggregation [List and Puppe, 2009], we now formu-
late a number of axioms reflecting basic desirable properties
of MACFs, and we analyse to what extent some of the MACFs
defined in Section 3 satisfy these axioms.
The first axiom postulates that the set of meta-agendas com-
puted should be independent of the identity of the voters.
Definition 20 A meta-agenda choice function F satisfies
anonymity if F (G1, . . . , Gn) = F (Gσ(1), . . . , Gσ(n)) for
any profile of dependency graphs (G1, . . . , Gn) and any per-
mutation σ : N → N of the set of voters.
The next axiom is a form of neutrality, which we call
dependency-neutrality. Given a meta-agenda M and two
issues a, b ∈ I, we say that M respects the (potential) de-
pendency of b on a, if either (1) a and b are part of the same
subset (i.e., will be decided upon in the same local election), or
if (2) a belongs to a subset preceding the subset containing b
(i.e., a will be decided upon in a local election that will take
place before the local election involving b). Our neutrality
axiom requires MACFs to be neutral wrt. these kinds of de-
pendencies. It stipulates that if for two edges (a, b) and (a′, b′)
it is the case that for each voter i either both (a, b) and (a′, b′)
or neither of them occur in i’s dependency graph, then any
meta-agenda returned by F should either respect both of the
corresponding potential dependencies or neither of them.
Definition 21 A meta-agenda choice function F satisfies
dependency-neutrality if, for any profile of dependency
graphs (G1, . . . , Gn) and any issues a, b, a′, b′ ∈ I, it is the
case that whenever (a, b) ∈ Gi iff (a′, b′) ∈ Gi for all vot-
ers i ∈ N then any meta-agenda in F (G1, . . . , Gn) respects
dependency (a, b) iff it respects dependency (a′, b′).
The third axiom we introduce is reinforcement. It is closely
modelled on the standard reinforcement axiom familiar from
voting theory and stipulates that if we aggregate two separate
profiles of dependency graphs and the resulting sets of meta-
agendas have a nonempty intersection, then aggregating the
union of these two profiles should result in precisely the meta-
agendas in that intersection. To express this axiom formally
we need to index MACFs by the sets of voters they are used
with: FN⊆N : DG(I)N⊆N → 2MAG(I) \{∅} . That is, F is
now a family of MACFs, one for every possible electorate.
Definition 22 A meta-agenda choice function F satisfies
reinforcement if FN (~G) ∩ FN ′( ~G′) = S 6= ∅ implies
FN∪N
′
(~G∪ ~G′) = S for any disjoint electorates N,N ′ ⊆ N
and dependency graph profiles ~G ∈ DG(I)N and ~G′ ∈
DG(I)N ′ for these electorates.
Some of our MACFs satisfy all three axioms:
Proposition 4 Any quota-based MACF (including the canon-
ical MACF) satisfies anonymity, neutrality and reinforcement.
Proof. For lack of space, we only sketch the main ideas.
Anonymity is immediately seen to be satisfied, as all of the
functions covered are symmetric wrt. dependency graphs in the
input. Dependency-neutrality is satisfied by virtue of the fact
that the procedures concerned decide on which dependencies
to respect one by one, always using the same criterion for
inclusion. To see that reinforcement is satisfied, first observe
that a quota-based MACF always returns a single meta-agenda;
the claim then follows easily from the definitions. 
In our context, reinforcement is in fact a very weak property.
However it is not satisfied by all procedures. For instance,
constraint-based procedures will typically not satisfy it, be-
cause a bound on the number of violations can be much more
easily respected in a small electorate than in a large one.
Finally, we state two results for distance-based MACFs Fd,g
that relate the properties of the distance d and the aggregator g
to the corresponding MACF. Elkind et al. [2010] prove similar
results in the context of voting procedures defined in terms
of consensus profiles and distances between profiles. For the
next result, we require the notion of a symmetric aggregator
g : RN → R. An aggregator g is symmetric if for every
permutation σ : N → N it is the case that g(x1, . . . , xn) =
g(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)) for all (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RN .
Proposition 5 If g is a symmetric aggregator, then the MACF
based on Fd,g is anonymous for any distance d.
We omit the simple proof. For the next result, we need to
define what constitutes a neutral distance between graphs.
Let σ : I → I be a permutation of the vertices of the graph
G. We can extend σ to G in the obvious manner by defining
the edges of σ(G) as follows: (a, b) ∈ Eσ(G) if and only if
(σ−1(a), σ−1(b)) ∈ G. A distance d defined on graphs is
neutral if d(G,G′) = d(σ(G), σ(G′)) for G,G′ ∈ DG(I).
Proposition 6 If d is a neutral distance, then the MACF based
on Fd,g is dependency-neutral for any aggregator g.
The proof is tedious but conceptually not difficult.
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Figure 1: Largest cluster size for edgewise voting with 10
agents, 10 issues, and a full range of quotas
5 Experiments
While the canonical MACF rules out dependency violations,
it will often result in local elections that involve too many
issues to be feasible in practice. Constraint-based MACFs do
allow us to balance computational and social choice-theoretic
needs, but they are (typically) computationally intractable.
This leaves the quota-based edgewise choice functions, which
are appealing due to their conceptual and computational sim-
plicity, but which do not give us direct control over either the
size of local elections or the number of dependency violations.
In this section we report on an experimental study of edgewise
choice functions in view of these two criteria.
To generate an input profile, we fix a graph G0 from which
we generate n perturbed copies (one for each agent). For
each copy, we delete each edge in G0 with probability r1, and
we add each edge not present in G0 with probability r2. For
our experiments, G0 is a graph where each of the p issues is
involved in exactly one dependency relation and r1 = r2 =
0.2. Thus, our agents have sparse dependency graphs that
differ, but not too dramatically.
For each quota1 from 1 to 10, we generated 1000 10-agent,
10-issue instances, and computed the resulting meta-agendas.
Figure 1 shows the minimum, average, and maximum largest
cluster size found in these meta-agendas. (For example, with
a quota of 4 agents, the largest cluster in the meta-agendas
contained an average of 4.57 issues.) Figure 2 shows, for the
same instances, the number of dependency violations accord-
ing to two measures: (1) the agent-issue violations, i.e., the
sum of the dependency violations over all voters, and (2) the
agent-election violations, i.e., the number of pairs of an agent i
and a local election E such that, according to i, an issue in E
depends on an issue to be decided in a later election.
Edgewise choice with quotas 1 and 10, respectively, gener-
ate the union and intersection graphs of the profiles; hence, the
meta-agendas for quota 1 are monolithic while for quota 10
they are atomic. High quotas will produce more violations
1In this section only, “quota” is the number of agents required to
accept a dependency (i.e., this is q · n in Definition 16).
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Figure 2: Number of violations for edgewise voting with 10
agents, 10 issues, and a full range of quotas
than lower quotas; a quota of 1 will produce no violations
at all. Note the dramatic change which occurs over quotas
3–5. When the quota increases from 3 to 4, the average cluster
size halves, and (more than) halves again from 4 to 5. The
minimum cluster size drops precipitously over the same range.
At the same time, the rate of increase in number of viola-
tions begins to decline around quota 4. With 10 agents, a
quota of 4 gives a good balance between low maximum clus-
ter size—which limits the number of alternatives in any local
election—and low numbers of dependency violations.
6 Conclusions
Voting in combinatorial domains is a highly challenging prob-
lem, with no general solution in sight. In this paper, we have
introduced the notion of a meta-agenda choice function as
a manner of isolating the choice of a suitable agenda, given
only the preferential dependency information provided by the
voters, from the rest of the problem.
We have introduced several procedures for making this
choice in practice, ranging from the canonical procedure that
does not violate any preferential dependencies, over constraint-
based procedures in which violations of dependencies and the
size of local elections can be balanced explicitly, to the con-
ceptually simple quota-based edgewise choice functions, in
which a dependency is respected only if a certain number of
voters ask for it to be respected. We have also formulated a
number of simple axioms for meta-agenda choice functions,
suggesting that this aspect of the more general problem of vot-
ing in combinatorial domains is in itself a candidate for deeper
axiomatic analysis, and we have established some basic results
regarding the satisfaction of these axioms by our procedures.
Finally, we have reported on an experimental study of the
class of quota-based procedures as a means of exemplifying
the dilemma faced by a designer of a voting procedure for
multi-issue elections when having to balance computational
and social choice-theoretic considerations.
We believe that the main contribution of this paper is of a
conceptual nature: to isolate the problem of agenda choice as
an important subtask in mastering the challenges of voting in
combinatorial domains and to provide a technical framework
for studying this subtask. Of course, this raises more questions
than it does answer, and there are numerous directions for
future work that should be explored. We only mention three
of the most pressing ones here. First, it will be important to
understand how the properties of the (meta-)agenda choice
function and the properties of the local voting procedures to-
gether determine the properties of the overall voting procedure.
Second, there are a number of different assumptions that we
could make regarding the “attitudes” of voters when faced
with a local election for which they are uncertain about their
preferences (e.g., they might be optimists, assuming that the
remaining issues will be decided in their favour). The question
then arises how these attitudes influence election outcomes.
Third, we require a better understanding of the reduction in
elicitation complexity achieved by first eliciting only preferen-
tial dependencies and then votes on small domains rather than
directly eliciting a vote on the full combinatorial domain.
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